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THE FUNCTIONS OF JUSTICE AND ANTI-JUSTICE IN THE PEACEBUILDING PROCESS

Michael P. Scharft and PaulR. Williamst
Ifyou want peace, work forjustice.
Pope Paul VI on January 1, 1972,
in a homily on World Peace Day.'

To end the war is the primary responsibility of the peace
negotiator. To assign responsibility and call for justice is
the responsibility of thefact-finder--but she or he must not
expect the peace negotiatorto turn prosecutor.
Anonymous UN official2
I. Introduction
The norm of justice applied through the approach of accountability
can be an extremely useful tool for the diplomat or peace-builder.
Traditionally, peace-builders have relied upon the approach of either
accommodation or the use of force in an effort to accomplish desired ends.
In most cases, the tool of justice/accountability was neglected, or, if used,
not employed in a constructive manner. Recently, however, there has been
increasing use of the tool of justice/accountability in the peace-building
process, including in South Africa, the former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone,
Rwanda, East Timor, Cambodia, and Iraq.
Yet, the norm of justice, while increasingly invoked, is seldom defined
in the context of peace-building. To understand the role that justice has
t Professor of Law and Director of the Frederick K. Cox International Law Center at Case
Western Reserve University School of Law; formerly Attorney-Adviser for United Nations
Affairs at the U.S. Department of State during the first Bush and Clinton Administrations.
" Rebecca Grazier Professor of Law and International Relations at American University;
formerly Attorney-Adviser for European Affairs at the U.S. Department of State during the
first Bush and Clinton Administrations. Professor Williams served as legal counsel to the
Bosnian delegation at the Dayton negotiations and the Kosovar delegation at the
RambouilletlParis negotiations.
1Pope Paul XI, Homily on World Peace Day (Jan. 1, 1972).
Human Rights in Peace Negotiations, 18 HUM. RTs. Q. 249, 256 (1996).

2 Anonymous,
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played and has the potential of playing in the peace-building process, it is
important first to define the norm as well as articulate its functions. This
article therefore serves as an introduction to The Case Western Reserve
Journal of International Law's "Role of Justice in Building Peace"
Symposium Issue by providing a detailed definitional description of the
justice norm. In addition, it identifies the variety of functions performed by
the norm of justice and the approach of accountability during the peacebuilding process. This is followed by an examination of the perceived
conflict between the approaches of accountability and accommodation,
which lies at the core of the common belief that it is sometimes necessary to
swap justice for peace.
In our examination of the functions of justice in the peace-building
process, we use the former Yugoslavia as an illustrative case study.
Reference to the Yugoslavia experience provides a particularly useful
touchstone for this analysis because in no other peace-building process in
history has there been so much political emphasis placed on the need to
employ the norm of justice, and so much energy devoted to creating and
utilizing justice-based institutions. The Yugoslav conflict is a particularly
fertile research ground for accurately assessing the role of justice in peacebuilding given the UN Security Council's creation of the United Nations
War Crimes Commission for Yugoslavia and the subsequent creation of the
Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal; the utilization of the World Court by the
government of Bosnia to allege genocide by the government of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia ("FRY"); the application of a plethora of minor
institutions such as human rights rapporteurs, domestic truth commission
and criminal prosecutions; and the extensive deployment of human rights
monitors to prevent violations of international humanitarian law.
11. Defining Justice and Anti-Justice in the Context ofPeace-Building
Justice being done, and being seen to be done, is the difference
between a lastingpeace and an intervalbetween hostilities.
Ed Vulliamy,
3
Correspondent for The Guardian
The word "norm" refers to collectively established guides for action; it
originates from a Greek word referring to a carpenter's square. When the
norm of justice is applied to the peace-building process, it operates as a
carpenter's square in that it constrains the actions of state and sub-state
parties to the dispute, including the actions of third party actors. The norm
3 Ed Vulliamy, Bosnia: The Crime of Appeasement, 74 INT'L AFFAIRS 73, 89 (1998)
(quoting Justice Goldstone).
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of justice also guides and in some cases dictates the actions to be taken by
the parties, and may in some instances dictate specific terms to be included
in a peace agreement or actions to be undertaken to aid the peace-building
process. The sides of the carpenter's square of justice are comprised of
truth, fairness, rectitude, and retribution/requital.
As important as understanding the definition ofjustice, it is essential to
understand the nature of certain acts which undermine the effectiveness of
the norm of justice, or acts which may be deemed to constitute the norm of
"anti-justice." We use the term anti-justice, rather than the more narrow
term injustice, to describe a peac'e-building approach characterized by
intentional falsehoods and propaganda, perpetual impartiality and moral
equivalence, the active erosion of the moral imperative to take action, and
impunity and de facto or de jure immunity.
A. The Essence of Justice
In the context of peace-building, truth relates to an accurate
understanding and recording of the causes of a conflict, as well as which
parties are responsible for which actions, and which parties, including
individuals, may be characterized as the victims or the aggressors
(including the possibility that both parties are the aggressors). Truth also
requires an understanding and articulation of the objectives of the various
parties, including those of third parties, and an assessment of those interests
in light of generally accepted rules of international behavior-in particular,
those set forth in the UN Charter and other legal instruments. 4
An example of the use of truth to influence the peace process is the
report of the War Crimes Commission created by the United Nations in
1993 to assess the nature of the conflict in Yugoslavia and the extent to
which the various parties were responsible for war crimes. This report,
consisting of over 3,000 pages, paints a fairly accurate portrayal of the
nature and extent of the crimes committed by all the parties, finding that
although representatives of each party had committed crimes, warranting
the creation of an international tribunal, it was clear the Serbian forces were
acting as aggressors and they had committed the vast majority of crimes.
This may be contrasted with what the authors were told were efforts of
David Owen, the co-chair of the UN/EU peace process, to persuade the
chairman of the War Crimes Commission to find that all three of the parties
4 See Richard J. Goldstone, Justice as a Tool for Peace-Making: Truth Commissions and

InternationalCriminal Tribunals, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 485,486 (1996).
5 Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/19941674
(1994).
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had committed a roughly equal number of crimes and all were therefore
equally culpable.
Fairness relates to an initial approach of impartiality-which can and
must be adjusted in light of the truth about the conflict. Thus, while fairness
requires that at the initiation of the conflict third parties approach peacebuilding in an impartial manner, it also requires that once elements of truth
are ascertained, they not be misrepresented in order to maintain artificial
impartiality, but rather that they be incorporated into the decision-making
process and policy be adjusted accordingly. An example of the use of
fairness to guide the peace process is the State Department's attempts in the
spring of 1999 to provide extensive detail to the public as to the nature of
the crimes being committed by the Serbian regime in Kosovo, 6 even to the
extent of naming names of suspected war criminals.7
Fairness also requires that third parties do not seek to apply undue
pressure on the victims of a conflict in order to achieve an expedient
political objective. This application is best exemplified by the U.S. efforts
at the RambouilletiParis negotiations to openly acknowledge the victim
status of the Kosovars. Thus, although the United States sought to persuade
the Kosovar delegation to accept major concessions sought by the Serbian
side, it did not initially seek to exploit their victim status. This can be
contrasted with the approach of the United States four years earlier in the
Dayton negotiations, where the United States threatened to close the talks
and blame their failure on the Bosnian delegation if the Bosnians failed to
agree to a number of concessions, which the Bosnians thought might
undermine any serious effort to build peace-knowing that if the Bosnians
were blamed for the failure of the negotiations, this would erode
international support for protecting them from the continued campaign of
genocide.
Rectitude encompasses a sense of moral virtue, integrity, and
righteousness, requiring the parties to "do the right thing" based in part on
6 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, ERASING HISTORY: ETHNIC CLEANSING IN KosOvo

(1999),

available at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/rpt_9905_ethnicksvo-toc.html; James
Rubin, U.S. Dep't of State, Press Briefing on Massacre of Kosovar Albanians (May 19,
1999), available at http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/docs99/990519_rubinmassacre_htm
(last visited Oct. 12, 2003); Amb. David Scheffer, U.S. Dep't of State, On-the Record
available at
(Apr.
9,
1999),
in
Kosovo
on
Atrocities
Briefing
http://www.state.gov/www/policyremarks/1999/990409_scheffer-kosovo.html (last visited
Oct. 12, 2003); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, THE ETHNIC CLEANSING OF Kosovo: FACT SHEET
(May 14, 1999), at
BASED ON INFORMATION FROM U.S. GOVERNMENT SOURCES

http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/rpt_990514_ksvoethnic.html.
7 JAMES P. RUBIN, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, RESPONSIBILITY OF INDIVIDUAL YUGOSLAV ARMY
AND MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS COMMANDERS FOR CRIMES COMMITTED BY FORCES
at
available
(Apr.
7,
1999),
IN
Kosovo
THEIR
COMMAND
UNDER
http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/statements/1999/ps990407.html (last visited Oct.

11,2003).
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their assessment of the truth and the application of fairness, but also
including the legitimate interests of the third-party states and institutionsthe legitimacy of which is defined by principles of international law and
generally accepted norms of state behavior. Although rectitude may seem
subjective, in matters of armed conflict involving ethnic aggression and
crimes against humanity it is usually possible to draw certain boundaries
around the behavior of state and sub-state actors.
A peace process influenced by rectitude, for example, would likely
find the peace-builders reluctant to substantially accommodate or appease
those responsible for orchestrating crimes against humanity as this
legitimizes those actors and their methods, while also providing an
opportunity for them to ratify at the negotiating table the fruits of their
crimes. Moreover, the likelihood of building a meaningful peace on the
promises and commitments of individuals and institutions responsible for
crimes against humanity is greatly diminished, as evidenced by the
multitude of failed cease-fires negotiated by various UNPROFOR generals
with Serbian leaders Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, who were
indicted by the Yugoslav Tribunal for genocide.8
The guide of rectitude may also lead third parties to adopt appropriate
policy responses to the conflict. For instance, in the Bosnian conflict and
the early stages of the Kosovo conflict, the United States and its allies
sought a negotiated settlement with those directly responsible for
orchestrating the ethnic aggression. Failing to heed the guide of rectitude
resulted in five atrocity-filled years of conflict, and a peace settlement in
Bosnia many critics believe ratifies the gains of ethnic cleansing,
widespread war crimes, and crimes against humanity. In contrast, when, in
the case of Kosovo, the United States and its allies ascertained negotiations
with the perpetrators would no longer suffice as a viable policy, they
embarked on the use of force to defeat the Serbian military forces operating
in Kosovo. As a result, the gains of ethnic cleansing were reversed, and
there appears to be a greater likelihood for a meaningful peace in Kosovo.
Retribution/requital comprises notions of compensation for victims,
punishment of aggressors, recompense for physical damage, delegitimization of responsible institutions, and re-imposition of the rule of
law. It does not encompass notions of revenge, retaliation, or reprisals.
Institutions frequently associated with this norm include war crimes
tribunals and truth commissions. Retribution/requital is particularly
important in peace-building as, according to one notable commentator, "[i]n
the fragile political climate that exists following a settlement, the9
considerable."
are
revenge
and
retribution
for
temptation
8 Prosecutor v. Karadzic and Mladic, Indictment, I.C.T.Y., No. IT-95-5
17 (1995),
available at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/kar-ii950724e.htm (last visited Sept.
19, 2003).
9 Fen Osler Hampson, Can Peacebuilding Work?, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 701, 714 (1997).

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. 35:161

Retribution/requital and associated institutions "bring an element of
impartiality that is necessary to restore faith in the judicial process and in
the rule of law," something the parties and their domestic institutions are
unlikely to accomplish on their own.' 0
An example of the influence of retribution/requital on the peace
process is the establishment of the Yugoslav Tribunal to try those
responsible for war crimes within the territory of the former Yugoslavia.
Other examples include the case against the FRY brought in the World
Court by Bosnia and a similar case pending by Croatia, the Dayton
Accords' creation of a property restitution commission, and discussions
about a possible Bosnian Truth Commission.
B. The Essence of Anti-Justice
The antithesis of truth is falsehood, often spread by propaganda. For
example, as detailed in U.S. Department of State cables, and a number of
more recent publications, Slobodan Milosevic relied upon a highly capable
propaganda machine to at first stir the nationalist feelings of the Serbian
population into support for his objective of an ethnically pure greater Serbia
and then to promote recruitment into the paramilitary forces responsible for
many of the brutal acts of ethnic cleansing." As noted by U.S. Ambassador
Warren Zimmermann, through a barrage of propaganda via the state-owned
media, 12 Milosevic played on Serb fears and feelings of victimization, going
back to their defeat by the Ottomans at Kosovo in 1389, and emphasizing their
treatment at the hands of the Ustasha during World War II. "The virus of
television," 13Ambassador Zimmermann recounts, "spread ethnic hatred like an
epidemic."'
Slobodan Milosevic then turned his propaganda enterprise toward the
international community and successfully imbued Western foreign
policymakers with falsehoods such as the war was caused by the bubbling
over of "ancient ethnic hatreds," all the parties were in effect "warring
10 Id.
11 For a concise summary of the Milosevic propaganda campaign, see Georgie Anne
Geyer, How the Conscience of the West Was Lost, in

THE CONCEIT OF INNOCENCE: LOSING
THE CONSCIENCE OF THE WEST IN THE WAR AGAINST BOSNIA 74, 91-95 (Stjepan G. Mettovid

ed., 1997).
12 For a review of the use of media by all three parties, see MARK

THOMPSON, FORGING

WAR: THE MEDIA IN SERBIA, CROATIA AND BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA (Ann Naughton ed.,

1994).
13 Warren Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and Its DestroyersAmerica's Last Ambassador Tells What Happened and Why 121 (1996). According to
Ambassador Zimmermann, "Those who argue that 'ancient Balkan hostilities' account for
the violence that overtook and destroyed Yugoslavia ignore the power of television in the
service of officially provoked racism." Id. at 120.
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factions" equally responsible for the commission of atrocities, the conflict
was a "civil war" not involving Serbia, and the Bosnian government was
prone to killing its own civilians in order to garner international sympathy
and intervention.' 4 The adoption of these falsehoods greatly undercut the
influence of the norm ofjustice. 5
While the U.S. embassy in Belgrade accurately reported on the efforts
of the Serbian regime to use propaganda to influence the international
community, 16 a number of foreign policymakers succumbed to these
efforts.' 7 In particular, David Owen readily adopted the notion of warring
factions equally responsible for atrocities as it promoted his objective of a
negotiated settlement of the conflict without the complicated involvement
of the norm of justice. Similarly, Secretary of State Warren Christopher
adopted Milosevic's notion of ancient ethnic hatreds along with the notion
of warring factions, 18 to create the impression that the conflict was
14For a comprehensive refutation of the myth of the bubbling over of "ancient ethnic
hatreds," see ROBERT J. DONIA & JOHN V.A. FINE, JR., BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA: A TRADITION
BETRAYED (1994). For a more concise refutation, see GEYER, supra note 11, at 91-95.
15For example, according to Carol Hodge, Robert Wareing, a member of the House of
Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, publicly informed the House of Commons
that the 1992 bread line massacre in Sarajevo, which killed twenty Muslim civilians, was
carried out by Muslims to gain sympathy from the world community and increase antipathy
toward Serbia. CAROL HODGE, THE SERB LOBBY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 13 (Henry M.
Jackson School of Int'l Stud., The Donald W. Treadgold Papers No. 22, 1999).
16For examples of the U.S. State Department reporting on Serbian propaganda, see
Telegram from American Embassy in Belgrade to Secretary of State (Feb. 15, 1994)
(Document Number 94BELGRA01209); see also Telegram from American Embassy in
Belgrade to Secretary of State (Feb. 15, 1994) (Doc. No. 94BELGRA01232), available at
http://www.foia.state.gov/documents/foiadocs/554a.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2003); see also
Telegram from American Embassy in Belgrade to Secretary of State (Oct. 1994) (Doc. No.
94BELGRA05955), available at http://www.foia.state.gov/documents/foiadocs/5524.pdf
(last visited Sept. 19, 2003).
17 For a dense, but useful, assessment of the extent to which Serbian misrepresentations
found their way into the political decision-making process, see DAVID CAMPBELL, NATIONAL
DECONSTRUCTION: VIOLENCE, IDENTITY AND JUSTICE IN BOSNIA (1998). See KJELL ARILD
NILSEN, EUROPAS SVIK: ET OPPGJOR MED VESTLIG UNNFALLENHET I BOSNIA (1996); see also
PAOLO RUMIZ, MASCHERE PER UN MASSACRO 166 (1996). A typical example of the
absorption of Serbian propaganda by government officials is former U.S. Secretary of State
Lawrence Eagleburger's statement in July 1995 just after the Srebrenica massacre that, "they
have been killing each other with a certain amount of glee in that part of the world for some
time now." Interview by Charlie Rose with Lawrence Eagleburger, U.S. Secretary of State,
Charlie Rose Transcript #1420 (July 13, 1995), cited in MICHAEL A. SELLS, THE BRIDGE
BETRAYED: RELIGION AND GENOCIDE INBOSNIA 124 (1996).
18 See, e.g., U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Special State Department
Briefing on the Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia (Feb. 10, 1993), in FED. NEWS SERVICE,
Feb. 10, 1993 ("These circumstances in the former Yugoslavia have deep roots. The death of
[Yugoslav] President Tito and the end of communist domination of the former Yugoslavia
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inevitable and the American government could therefore not be faulted for
failing to prevent the conflict or the continuing atrocities.1 9 And the
propensity for UNPROFOR commander General Janvier to "believe Serb
propaganda," according to his aides, was in part responsible for his
rejection of close air support to defend the UN declared safe area of
Srebrenica, which could prevented the subsequent massacre of 7,000
civilians.2 °
Not all those involved in seeking a resolution of the conflict fell victim
to Milosevic's propaganda ploys, as illustrated by General Wesley Clark's
assessment that "[a]bove all, I recognized that fundamentally, quarrels in
the region were not really about age old religious differences but rather the

raised the lid on the cauldron of ancient ethnic hatreds. This is a land where at least three
religions, at least a half a dozen ethnic groups have vied across the centuries. It is the
birthplace of World War I. It has long been the cradle of European conflict. And so it is
today."). See also Interview by Roger Mudd with Warren Christopher, Secretary of State,
"MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour" (Aug. 11, 1993) (Warren Christopher declared, "In Bosnia,
there are such ancient hatreds that evidently the ethnic groups want to try to divide it and be
in separate enclaves. That will be a decision that they will have to make, and it's very hard to
dictate that from a distance."). See also U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher,
Address at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Plenary Session (Nov. 30,
1993) ("We call upon all warring parties to stop their unconscionable conduct that blocks the
delivery of critically needed supplies through [Tuzla airport]. We also call upon the warring
parties to live up to their recently signed agreements to permit secure land access for relief
convoys. The warring parties must see that this is in their best interests. Full access will
serve the vital needs of all Bosnia's factions."). Even President Clinton found himself
adopting the notions of warring factions and civil war in an exchange with reporters, where
he declared: "But there will not be-the killing is a function of a political fight between three
factions. Until they agree to quit doing it, it's going to continue. And I don't think that the
international community has the capacity to stop people within the nation from their civil
war until they decide to do it." Exchange with Reporters (Jan. 24, 1994), in 1 PUBLIC PAPERS
OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: WILLIAM J. CLINTON 121, 122 (1995).

19 See Geyer, supra note 11, at 91.
20

According to David Rohde:
A key element in Janvier's thinking was an apparent belief that he could do
business with the Bosnian Serbs. Janvier may have turned down the crucial
request for Close Air Support on the night before the town fell because he
sincerely believed General Tolimir's promise the Serb attack had stopped.
Janvier was quick to believe Serb propaganda and Mladic's complaints about
Muslim provocations, according to aides. Janvier argued in the June 9 meeting in
Split that the Serbs would no longer defy the UN if they were treated with
respect.

DAVID RHODE, ENDGAME: THE BETRAYAL AND FALL OF SREBRENICA, EUROPE'S WORST

MASSACRE SINCE WORLD WAR II 367 (1997).
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result of many unscrupulous and manipulative leaders seeking their own
power and wealth at the expense of ordinary people in their countries. 2 1
The antithesis of fairness is artificial impartiality and moral
equivalence. An example of moral equivalence created through falsehoods
occurred when, immediately after the Sarajevo market was struck by an
artillery shell in 1995 killing 68 Bosnians, General Michael Rose threatened
that, unless the Bosnian government signed up to yet another cease-fire, the
general would disclose to the media the Bosnian government had killed its
own people in an attempt to gain international sympathy. General Rose's
threat was made with full knowledge that a UN investigation had
determined the shell had in fact been fired by Serbian forces, and that the
U.S. embassy in Belgrade had reported that the conspiracy theory of
Bosnian government responsibility had in fact originated in Belgrade as
part of its propaganda effort.22
The antithesis of rectitude is behavior intended to erode the moral
imperative to take action. For example, Secretary Christopher sought to
erode the moral imperative to use force or take other aggressive action,
when he testified before the U.S. Congress in the spring of 1993 that all
parties to the conflict were equally responsible for the atrocities, which did
not amount to a campaign of genocide. At the time internal CIA and State
Department reports-subsequently leaked to the New York Timesindicated over 90 percent of the atrocities were being committed by Serbian
forces, and the campaign very likely constituted attempted genocide.2 3
The antithesis of retribution/requital is political legitimization and de
facto or de jure immunity. Political legitimization occurs when individuals
responsible for war crimes are embraced by the international mediators or
others as "partners in peace," and essential to the peace process. For
instance, David Owen repeatedly legitimized Radovan Karadzic by
embracing him as a legitimate partner in the ICFY negotiations in Geneva,
despite Karadzic's clear culpability at the time for attempted genocide.
Similarly, Richard Holbrooke's now famous quote just before the
negotiation of the Dayton Accords, "[y]ou can't make peace without
President Milosevic, 2 4 reestablished Milosevic as a legitimate partner in
peace despite his orchestration of genocide against non-Serbs. De facto
immunity is best represented by NATO's initial reluctance to apprehend
indicted war criminals at large in Bosnia and what may be perceived as
21 WESLEY

K.

CLARK, WAGING MODERN WAR: BOSNIA,

Kosovo,

AND THE FUTURE OF

COMBAT 68 (2001).
22 Telegram

from American Embassy in Belgrade to Department of State (Feb. 16, 1994)
(Doc. No. 94BELGRA01232).
23 See

MICHAEL P.

SCHARF,

BALKAN

JUSTICE:

THE

STORY

BEHIND THE

FIRST

24 Jurek Martin, US Fears Wider War in Balkans ifBosnia Talks Fail,
FIN.
(London), Nov. 2, 1995, at 3.

TIMES

INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIAL SINCE NUREMBERG 31 (1997).
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Slobodan Milosevic's immunity, until the spring of 1999, from his
international crimes.
III. The Functionsof Justice
Within the context of creating stable, peaceful societies out of war-tom
states, the norms and institutions of justice may serve several functions. These
include establishing individual responsibility and denying collective guilt,
dismantling and discrediting institutions and leaders responsible for the
commission of atrocities, establishing an accurate historical record, providing
victim catharsis, and promoting deterrence.
A. Establishing Individual Responsibility and Denying Collective
Guilt
The first function of justice is to expose the individuals responsible for
atrocities and to avoid assigning guilt to an entire people. If foreign
policymakers fail to grasp the notion of individual responsibility, they are likely
to assign collective responsibility to an entire population. Not only is such an
assignation of guilt inappropriate and unfair, but it will likely skew the policy
options under consideration for managing the crisis.
Importantly, by assigning guilt to specific perpetrators on all sides, the
Tribunal was designed to avoid the assignment of collective guilt which had
characterized the years following World War II and in part laid the foundation
for the commission of atrocities during the 1990s Balkan conflict. "Far from
being a vehicle for revenge," the first President of the Yugoslav Tribunal,
Antonio Cassese, explains, by individualizing guilt in hate-mongering leaders
and by disabusing people of the myth that adversary ethnic groups bear
collective responsibility for
the crimes, "[the Yugoslav Tribunal] is a tool for
' 25
promoting reconciliation.

,

The assignment of individual guilt to government leaders would also
serve the purpose of providing the justification for any use of force to
prevent the continued commission of atrocities. As noted by Michael
Walzer:
[t]he assignment of responsibility is the critical test of the
argument for justice .... If there are recognizable war crimes,
there must be recognizable criminals. . . . [T]he theory of

justice should point us to the men and women from whom we
25Report of the International Tribunalfor the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International HumanitarianLaw Committed in the Territory of the

Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., at 12, U.N. Doc. A/49/342 (1994).
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can rightly demand an accounting, and it should shape and
control the judgments we make of the excuses they offer (or
that are offered on their behalf) .... There can be no justice 26in
war if there are not, ultimately, responsible men and women.
While this function requires prosecution of responsible leaders, where
the norms and institutions do not attach individual liability to a significant
number of the individuals responsible for the commission of war crimes,
they run the risk that they will be unable to perform the function of denying
collective guilt, as many victims and observers will still believe that large
or important sections of the group associated with the atrocities are still at
large and will thus tend to blame the entire group rather than risk
inadvertent impunity. Moreover, those persons who escape individual
responsibility will feel emboldened by their impunity and are more likely to
commit future crimes or interfere with the peace-building process in other
ways. This risk is particularly acute in the former Yugoslavia where the
Office of the Prosecutor has indicted only approximately 100 individuals of
the over 7,000 it estimates are indictable.
B. Dismantling Institutions and Discrediting Leaders Responsible
for Atrocities
The second function of justice is to provide a foundation for
dismantling institutions and discrediting leaders and their ideology that
have promoted war crimes. When a government pursues policies of ethnic
cleansing or systematically denies human rights, it is often done through
legal structures. South Africa's apartheid government used its constitution
to oppress, and special government forces to torture and murder, members
of black opposition groups. The South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission was later given the task of documenting the full extent of
government involvement in racial killings and incidents of torture to help
remove the stigma of past wrongs from new governmental institutions. In
Yugoslavia, too, government leaders and government forces were a driving
force behind much of the ethnic killing.
Through the work of various justice-based institutions, in particular the
Tribunal, it becomes possible to promote the dismantling of the institutions
and a discrediting of the leaders who encouraged, enabled, and carried out the
commission of humanitarian crimes. Drawing on his experience as the head
of South Africa's Goldstone Commission (a predecessor to the South
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission), Justice Goldstone observes
that "exposure of the nature and extent of human rights violations
26 MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MoRAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL

ILLUSTRATIONS 287-88 (1977).
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frequently will reveal a systematic and institutional pattern of gross human
rights violations. It will assist in the identification and dismantling of
institutions responsible [for these crimes] and deter future recurrences. 27
In the case of Serbia, there is particular benefit to laying bare to Serbs
unscathed in Belgrade the consequences of nationalistic rhetoric. 28 Even for
those who continue to support Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and
former Serb President Slobodan Milosevic, "it will be much more difficult to
dismiss live testimony given under oath than simple newspaper reports," the
Tribunal's deputy prosecutor, Graham Blewitt points out. "The testimony will
send a reminder in a very dramatic way that these crimes were horrendous, 29
and presumably aid in the continued democratic transformation of Serbia. A
notable effect to date of the norm of justice has been to discredit the concept
that it is permissible to commit atrocities in the effort to create a greater Serbia.
For instance, the Serbian Orthodox Patriarch Pavle, speaking in Kosovo in
June 1999, declared, "'If the only way to create a greater Serbia is by crime
...then I do not accept that, and let that Serbia disappear. And also if a
lesser Serbia can only survive by crime, let it also disappear. And if all the
Serbs had to die and only I remained and I could30live only by crime, then I
would not accept that, it would be better to die."
By failing to make sufficient information available about the
individuals, institutions, and ideologies associated with the commission of
atrocities, there is a significant risk that these individuals, institutions, and
ideas may in fact attain some degree of de facto legitimization. For
instance, the Office of the Prosecutor's prolonged failure to publicly indict
the leaders of the Serbian political and military regime responsible for the
atrocities in Bosnia and the failure of the United States to consistently
identify certain political leaders as suspected war criminals-and in fact
publicly rehabilitating them-served the purpose of legitimizing the
Serbian regime, which then committed nearly identical atrocities in
Kosovo. Moreover, the failure of the United States and its allies to provide
the Tribunal with the resources and evidence to indict Slobodan Milosevic
prior to the Dayton negotiations enabled him not only to substantially
influence the institutional structure of post-war Bosnia in a manner which
furthered his objectives but also legitimized him as a partner in peace.
The need for the mechanisms of justice to de-legitimize the
perpetrators of international crimes is all the more crucial given the
27

28

Goldstone, supra note 4, at 490.
See

PETER MORGAN,

A

BARREL OF STONES: IN SEARCH OF SERBIA

51-53 (1997)

(offering an important discussion of how the citizens of Serbia have managed to
psychologically shield themselves from the atrocities committed in their name).
29 Interview with Graham Blewitt, Deputy Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia, in The Hague, Netherlands (July 25, 1996).
30 Carlotta Gall, Serb Orthodox Leaders Denounce Milosevic's Policies as Criminal, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 29, 1999, at A9.
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propensity of international peace negotiators to either avoid assigning
responsibility for such crimes or to actually praise the behavior and
personal characteristics of war criminals. A telling example is a previously
classified State Department demarche to Radovan Karadzic in April 1994
concerning the commission of war crimes in Banja Luka and the UN safe
area of Gorazde, which declares, "those responsible for committing these
crimes should be apprehended and punished. We expect you to do so."'3 1 As
noted in the Tribunal's indictment of Karadzic for genocide, he was in fact
the individual known to be responsible for orchestrating these crimes. More
damaging to the peace process and the operation of the norm of justice may
be frequent accolades, such as David Owen's description of Radovan
Karadzic (later indicted for genocide) as a "gracious host," with "excellent
English." Other examples of this include Warren Christopher's
characterization of Slobodan Milosevic (later indicted for crimes against
humanity and genocide) as "[t]hough unscrupulous and suspected of war
crimes, Milosevic has a rough charm, and he appealed to some Western
European leaders as a bulwark against an Islamic tide. 3 a Richard Holbrook
similarly characterized Milosevic as willing to walk the extra mile for peace
in Dayton. One of the more vivid journalistic accounts, according to Carol
Hodge, was a Milosevic-friendly BBC program aired during the Kosovo air
campaign titled "In the Mind of Milosevic," which portrayed him as a man
who "'talks, laughs, is a good singer, and likes a drink occasionally and
who, unlike President Clinton, doesn't cheat on his wife."' ' 33 Finally, a
senior British army officer characterized General Mladic (indicted for
genocide) in the following terms, "he has presence, and when he had power
he wielded it34 ruthlessly. That brought him some grudging respect, if not
admiration.,

31 Telegram from Secretary of State to American Embassy in Vienna (Apr. 1994).
32 WARREN CHRISTOPHER, IN THE STREAM OF HISTORY: SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY FOR A

NEW ERA 352 (1998).
33 HODGE,

supra note 15, at 32.

34 Unnamed British UNPROFOR officer, Reuters, Nov. 10, 1996. But see CLARK, supra

note 21, at 58 (noting that "[Mladic] carried a reputation among the U.N. forces for cunning
and forcefulness, I found him coarse and boastful. He knew far less than he thought about
NATO, airpower, and the capabilities of the United States.").
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C. Establishing an Accurate Historical Record
The third function served by justice is to establish an accurate
accounting of the actions of all parties and to create an accurate historical
record. If, to paraphrase George Santayana, a society is condemned to repeat
its mistakes if it does learn the lessons of the past, then a reliable record of
those mistakes must be established if we wish to prevent their recurrence.
Michael Ignatieff recognizes that the "great virtue of legal proceedings is that
[their] evidentiary rules confer legitimacy on otherwise contestable facts. In
this sense, war crimes trials make it more difficult for societies to take refuge
in denial; the trials do assist the process of uncovering the truth. 35 The chief
prosecutor at Nuremberg, Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, underscored
the logic of this proposition when he reported to President Truman that one of
the most important legacies of the Nuremberg trials following World War II
was that they documented the Nazi atrocities "with such authenticity and in
such detail that there can be no responsible denial of these crimes in the future
and no tradition of martyrdom of the Nazi leaders can arise among informed
people. 36
In both Guatemala and El Salvador, truth commissions were
established to resolve disputes between the former combatants as to who
was responsible for which atrocities. In each case an objective historical
record led to the establishment of credible judicial systems that then helped
to sustain peace.37 The problems of accurately assessing blame for war
crimes in the former Yugoslavia is especially acute. In Richard Goldstone's
words, "It doesn't take hours after human rights violations for the denials to
begin.... Justice plays a vital role in stopping that fabrication, in stopping
that cover-up, which is inevitable. 3 8
The need for an accurate accounting of the conflict is all the more
compelling in the case of the former Yugoslavia as according to Natasha
Kandic, head of the Humanitarian Law Fund in Belgrade, "when I tried to
talk about what I had seen and experienced [concerning atrocities in
Kosovo], people would get impatient and change the subject. It's as if
people here simply don't want to know the truth about what happened in
35 Michael Ignatieff, Articles of Faith, INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, Sept.-Oct. 1996, reprinted

in The Elusive Goal of War Trials, HARPER'S MAG., Mar. 1997, at 15, 16.
36 Report to the Presidentfrom Justice Robert H. Jackson, Chiefof Counselfor the United
States in the Prosecutionof Axis War Criminals, Oct. 7, 1946, quoted in 49 AM. J. INT'L L.
44,49 (1955).
37 See Neil J. Kritz, The Rule of Law in the Postconflict Phase: Building a Stable Peace,
in MANAGING GLOBAL CHAOS: SOURCES OF AND RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
587, 598-99 (Chester A. Crocker et al. eds., 1996).
38 Justice Richard J. Goldstone, Healing Wounded People, Speech at the United States
Holocaust Memorial Museum (Jan. 27, 1997).
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Kosovo. Even
39 the intellectuals are under the influence of official
propaganda.,
If the institution of the Yugoslav Tribunal operates as designed, the
Tribunal should generate a comprehensive record of the nature and extent of
crimes against humanity and genocide in the Balkans, how they were planned
and executed, the fate of individual victims, who gave the orders and who
carried them out. By carefully proving these facts one witness at a time in the
face of vigilant cross-examination by distinguished defense counsel, the
international trials would produce a definitive account that can pierce the
distortions generated by official propaganda, endure the test of time, and resist
the forces of revisionism.
Failure to create a comprehensive record will undermine many, if not
all, of the benefits associated with creating an accurate record. This risk is
heightened when only one institution of justice is employed, or where
others are minimized. For instance, although the Yugoslav Tribunal is
capable of creating a lengthy record for cases on its docket, there is no
official process for summarizing findings, and no process for including
facts not relevant to the specific cases before the Tribunal. In addition,
where a defendant is not present before the Tribunal the indictment and
Rule 61 hearing provide only a minimal basis for assessing the truth of the
alleged actions. In other cases, the death of defendants prior to judgment led
to a dismissal of their case, thereby erasing the official history of atrocities.
D. Victim Catharsis
The fourth function of justice is to acknowledge the victims of
crimes-an often overlooked but equally important element to the success
of any peace process as is punishing the offenders. Offering victims an
opportunity to state their injuries publicly can "provide victims with a sense
of justice and catharsis-a sense that their grievances have been addressed
and can more easily be put' to rest, rather than smoldering in anticipation of
the next round of conflict. AO
In South Africa, the Truth Commission heard tearful testimony from
thousands of victims as well as the confessions of many who played a role
in brutal killings for the apartheid regime. Although some of this testimony
was offered in exchange for amnesty, the overall effect was to purge the
national consciousness of past racial killings so that the society may be
rebuilt. In Yugoslavia the same logic was used in the International Criminal
Tribunal's creation. According to the Yugoslav Tribunal's first president,
Antonio Cassese, the pursuit of justice "is essential to the restoration of
39 Michael Dobbs, Serbs Shun Discussion of Atrocities, WASH. POST, June 24, 1999, at
Al.
40

Ambassador David Scheffer, Address at Dartmouth University (Oct. 1998).
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peaceful and normal relations especially for people who have had to live
under a reign of terror [because] [i]t breaks the cycle of violence, hatred,
and extra judicial retribution. ' '4 '
As Richard Goldstone noted, "the Nuremberg Trials played an important
role in enabling the victims of the Holocaust to obtain official
acknowledgment of what befell them.' 42 Such acknowledgment constitutes a
partial remedy for their suffering and a powerful catharsis that can discourage
acts of retaliation. According to Antonio Cassese, the "only civilized alternative
to this desire for revenge is to render justice" for otherwise "feelings of hatred
and resentment seething below the surface will, sooner or later, erupt and lead
to renewed violence. '' 3 As confirmed by Munira Subasic, who lost her
husband and one son in the Srebrenica massacre, "if we are deprived of the
right to justice, then we shall seek the right to revenge.' 44
If the norm of justice is employed, but not effectively, it can have the
disadvantage of raising the expectations of victims, and then causing them
additional psychological trauma as they come to perceive themselves as
abandoned, or worse, used by the international community to clear its own
conscience. As Justice Goldstone noted in response to the persistent failure
of the international community to arrest indicted war criminals Radovan
Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, "[i]magine [the victims'] disappointment at the
failure of the international community to follow through with the arrest of
those indicted. If this situation is not corrected, the establishment of the
caused more harm than good to the persons it
Yugoslav Tribunal will 'have
5
was intended to benefit. A
E. Deterrence
Finally, in the case of criminal prosecutions, the execution of justice
ideally acts as a deterrent against future humanitarian crimes, or at least sets
a precedent for accountability. As observed by David Scheffer, the U.S.
ambassador at large for war crimes issues, "[w]e know from experience in
Bosnia that local authorities-camp commanders and temporary local
41 Yugoslav Tribunal, Joint Statement By the President and the Prosecutor,U.N. Doc.
CC/PIO/027-E (Nov. 24, 1995).
42 Richard J.Goldstone, Fifty Years After Nuremberg: A New International Criminal

Tribunal for Human Rights Criminals, in CONTEMPORARY GENOCIDES: CAUSES, CASES,
CONSEQUENCES 215, 215-16 (Albert J. Jongman ed., 1996).
43 First Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International HumanitarianLaw Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Agenda Item 152,
15, U.N. Docs. A/49/342, S/1994/1007 (1994).
44Survivors Condemn 'Lenient' Verdict (BBC television broadcast, Aug. 2, 2001).
45Goldstone, supra note 4, at 499.

2003]

JUSTICE IN THE PEACE BUILDING PROCESS

'officials'-sometimes do what they can to improve the circumstances of
those under their care once they know that the international community will
investigate and punish those who fail to respect human rights standards. ' , 6
Richard Goldstone adds that the existence of the Tribunal may have deterred
widespread human rights violations during the Croatian army offensive against
Serb rebels in August 1995. "Fear of prosecution in The Hague," he said,
"prompted Croat authorities to issue orders to their soldiers to protect Serb
civilian rights when Croatia
took control of the Krajina and Western Slavonia
' 47
regions of the country.
Unfortunately, as the Tribunal was not at the time perceived to be a
meaningful threat, these "orders" were generally ignored with the consequence
that the Serbian population was subject to numerous atrocities. Goldstone also
argued that by broadcasting televised highlights of the trials throughout Bosnia
and Serbia, that message could get through directly to the citizenry, "people
don't relate to statistics, to generalizations. People can only relate and feel
when they hear somebody that they can identify with telling what happened to
them. That's why the public broadcasts of the Tribunal's cases can have a
strong deterrent effect
Moreover, the international prosecution of responsible individuals can
become "an instrument through which respect for the rule of law is instilled
into the popular consciousness."49 As Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, who
presided over the Tribunal's first trial, succinctly put it, "[w]e are here to tell
people that the rule of law has to be respected."5 The establishment of the
rule of law is particularly important since a dominant characteristic of the
post-Cold War era in international affairs is that conflicts occur among
peoples of different ethnic and religious backgrounds within states, not
between them. In war-torn societies, one of the most basic obstacles to
reconciliation is a lack of trust on the part of citizens between each other
and with their government. And one of the most effective ways to
institutionalize
that trust is to establish a stable legal system and the rule of
51
law.
46

David J. Scheffer, InternationalJudicialIntervention, FOREIGN POL'Y, Spring 1996, at

34, 39.
47 War Crimes Prosecutor Says Tribunal May Have Deterred Violations, DEUTscHE
PRESSE-AGENTUR, Jan. 26, 1996, LEXIS, News Library, DPA File.
48 Interview with Richard Goldstone, Justice of the Constitutional Court of South Africa,
in Brussels, Belgium (July 20, 1996).
49 See Payam Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, Peace in the Fonner Yugoslavia? A
Commentary on the UnitedNations War Crimes Tribunal,20 HUM. RTS. Q. 737, 749 (1998).
50
William W. Home, The Real Trial of the Century, AM. LAW., Sept. 1995, at 5.
51By rule of law, one generally assumes the presence of an independent judiciary that is
transparent, predictable, and impartial to the parties involved. The rule of law also relies
upon a legitimate, representative government to enforce the judiciary's decisions. This
should be distinguished from rule by law, through which authoritarian governments often
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Although the punishment of crimes committed in the Balkans would
send the message, both to potential aggressors and vulnerable minorities, that
the international community will not allow atrocities to be committed with
impunity, if a Tribunal is established and is unable to indict those responsible
for orchestrating the campaign of terror-as the case with the inability to
timely indict Mr. Milosevic for war crimes in Bosnia, then it may in fact
encourage them to feel free to commit atrocities in a future conflict-as in
Kosovo, believing they possess some degree of de facto immunity.
In many cases, however, the nature of injustice and internal pressures
militate toward the establishment of a truth commission often accompanied
by grants of amnesty to bring the dark practices of civil violence into the
light without necessarily prosecuting the guilty. 52 Versions of this system
has been adopted in South Africa, El Salvador, Chile, and Argentina, where
the calculation was made that the benefits of healing wounds through the
53
establishment of the truth outweighed the benefits of retributive justice.
But the particular circumstance of the crimes committed in the former
Yugoslavia required the formation of an ad hoc criminal tribunal for both
moral and practical reasons. First, the genocide, rape, and torture that
occurred were of a nature and scale so horrific that nothing short of full
accountability for those responsible would provide justice. Second, the
domestic legal systems in some of the republics of the former Yugoslavia
had been so thoroughly corrupted that they were not competent to conduct a
fair trial of the war's perpetrators, many of whom are still in power.

use the legal system to legitimate their oppression. See Neil J. Kritz, The Rule of Law in the
Postconflict Phase: Building a Stable Peace, reprinted in TURBULENT PEACE: THE

CHALLENGES OF MANAGING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 801-02 (Chester A. Crocker et al.
eds., 2001).
52 In the cases of Chile and Argentina, for example, "the prospect of trials for the gross
violations of human rights perpetrated under the old regime provoked bald threats of military
intervention." Kritz, supra note 37, at 595.
53 The South African Truth Commission is the most successful example of this type of
justice. Established with a two-year mandate, the Commission has strict criteria for whether
or not applicants qualify for indemnity in return for their testimony. There has to have been a
political motive for the applicant to have committed human rights violations and there must
be some degree of proportionality between that motive and the offenses committed. At the
time of this writing over 4,500 applications for indemnity had been received by the
commission. See Goldstone, supra note 4.
54 For a detailed accounting of "Serbian rape warfare" constructed from interviews with
victims of mass rape, see SEADA VRANiC, BREAKING THE WALL OF SILENCE: THE VOICES OF
RAPED BOSNIA (1996); MASS RAPE: THE WAR AGAINST WOMEN IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
(Alexandra Stighmayer ed., 1994); MARIA VON WELSER, AM ENDE WUNSCHST DU DIR NUR
NOCH DEN TOD: DIE MASSENVERGEWALTIGUNGEN IM KRIEG AUF DEM BALKAN (1993); and
BEVERLY ALLEN, RAPE WARFARE: THE HIDDEN GENOCIDE IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA AND

CROATIA (1996).
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Given that the norm of justice is based upon near universally accepted
principles and serves a variety of policy relevant functions ranging from
deterrence to victim catharsis, one might expect that it would play a central
if not determinative role in the peace-building process. The norm of justice
must, however, compete for influence with other highly relevant and
practicable approaches such as accommodation, economic inducement, and
the use of force, which are based on equally compelling principles, and
which have a longer history of use by peace builders.
IV. Accountability versus Accommodation
A. Defining the Approach of Accommodation
The approach of accommodation seeks to reduce conflict by
accommodating the interests of adversarial states or parties. In most
instances, the approach of accommodation instructs a negotiator to seek to
end the conflict by meeting as many of the objectives of each party as
possible, thereby accommodating their interests and satiating their appetite
for more conflict. If applied appropriately, the norm can lead to the creation
of win-win gaming situations where each party is able to attain its
objectives without unduly prejudicing the interests of the other party. Such
an outcome is most probable in a prisoners' dilemma and related situations,
and least possible in deadlock situations. To achieve political support for
accommodation, peace builders often employ the tools of anti-justice. If
applied recklessly or forced on a deadlock situation, such as the situation in
the former Yugoslavia, the norm of accommodation can ratify illegitimate
actions of a party and enhance its appetite for similar gains through further
conflict.
Institutions and individuals most frequently associated with the
approach of accommodation tend to be those most closely associated with
peace negotiations and thus include special envoys such as Yasushi Akashi
and Richard Holbrooke; and UN/EU peace conference co-chairs Lord
Carrington, Cyrus Vance, David Owen, Carl Bildt, and Thorvald
Stoltenberg. Accommodation is frequently the approach of choice because
it is the approach around which it is the easiest to build political will, and it
is the approach most likely to lead to a formal agreement among the parties.
The brokering of the Washington Agreement between Croatia and
Bosnia represents an example of the appropriate utilization of the
accommodation norm in that it was used to craft a relationship between
Bosnia and Croatia which sought to meet the needs, as far as possible, of
both parties while creating a system of democratic government capable of
preserving those interests. Unfortunately the system has in practice proven
difficult to implement, and may have represented too much of an
accommodation of minority interests.
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One of the more committed applications of the accommodation norm
was the proposed Vance/Owen Peace Plan which intended to bring peace
by essentially partitioning Bosnia into ethnically based cantons and
permitting the Serbian cantons to de facto confederate with Serbia proper.
The proposal thus sought to achieve peace at the expense of ratifying the
aims of the campaign of ethnic cleansing and legitimizing the antimulticultural nationalism propagated by the Serbian and Croatian
combatants. In fact, earlier David Owen had proposed that as EU mediator
he actively engage the parties in redrawing their territorial boundaries.
When this was rejected by eleven of the EU states he believed "[t]he refusal
to make these borders negotiable greatly hampered the EC's attempt at
crisis management in July and August 1991 and subsequently put all
peacemaking from September 1991 onwards within a straitjacket that
greatly inhibited compromises between the parties in dispute. 5 5
As it was, the Vance/Owen Peace Plan was widely perceived as the
catalyst for the conflict between Bosnian, Croats and the Bosnian
government as the Bosnian Croats sought to capture land "promised" them
under the peace plan.56 Similarly, with the aim of peace, the peace
negotiators embarked on an approach until 1995 of continually redrafting
peace plans to offer more and more favorable terms to the Serbian party
when it rejected earlier "take it or leave it" offers by the Contact Group. 7
Some critics have even argued UNPROFOR commander General Janvier
deliberately denied close air support to the UN Dutch defenders of
Srebrenica in order to make a negotiated settlement more feasible. 8 Other
55

DAVID OWEN, BALKAN ODYSSEY

33 (1995).

56 See YVES HELLER, DES BRASIERS MAL ETEINTS: UN REPORTER DANS LES GUERRES

YOUGOSLAVES 1991-95 (1997). For a firsthand account by a British officer of the conflict
resulting from the Vance/Owen Peace Plan, see BOB STEWART, BROKEN LIVES: A PERSONAL
VIEW OF THE BOSNIAN CONFLICT (1994).
57See 1.7 BALKAN WATCH: ACTION COUNCIL FOR PEACE INTHE BALKANS (Washington,
D.C.), Oct. 24, 1994, available at http://www.publicintemationallaw.org/programs/balkans/
archives/i 994/BW 17.DOC.
58 According to David Rhode, "The series of statements and proposals made by Janvier
before, during and after Srebrenica's fall indicate he may have intentionally allowed the safe
area to fall." RHODE, supra note 20, at 364. Rhode acknowledges though that:
Taking the extraordinary step of deciding to sacrifice a UN safe area on his
own without the permission of his superiors does not fit into Janvier's
character, according to supporters and detractors. 'This was a man who
should've been selling roasted chestnuts on the streets of Paris,' said one
former UNPROFOR official. 'Not making these kinds of decisions.'
RHODE,

supranote 20, at 368. Rhode also noted:
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commentators note air strikes were also blocked by the French government
as it had promised General Mladic it would seek to prevent air strikes in
exchange for the release of two French pilots and several hundred
UNPROFOR peacekeepers held hostage by Bosnian Serb forces in the
spring of 1995.59
The perspective of those supporting unfettered accommodation when
faced with the criticism that the approach of accommodation might reward
the use of force and ethnic cleansing, is typified by Canadian general Lewis
MacKenzie, the former head of the UN forces in Bosnia when he testified
before the U.S. Congress that "[n]ow, obviously the critics will say this
rewards force and sets a bad example. I can only say to them, read your
history. Force has been rewarded since the first caveman
60 picked up a club,
occupied his neighbor's cave and ran off with his wife.
Unfortunately, the over reliance on the approach of accommodation
can create situations where once diplomacy alone fails, policymakers are
reluctant to move on to or incorporate other norms, creating even more
intractable conflicts. As noted by former British defense minister Sir John
Nott in 1994, "[w]e will not bring about a diplomatic solution. Even if there
is peace obtained, it cannot hold. We have given these diplomats, these
committees ... two and a half years to bring about peace, and they have
failed.... I would remove the arms embargo [on the Bosnian Government]
straight away because it is only a military balance now in that part of the
world that can restore stability."'6' Similarly, Ed Vulliamy, the
correspondent for the Guardianduring the Bosnian conflict, argued that an
early use of force against Serb military targets designed to neutralize their
artillery and destroy their communications system would have brought
them to the negotiating table, and then "the Serbs would have been required
Suspicions about what U.S. intelligence knew about the attack on Srebrenica
and subsequent executions have been high. The CIA, the theory goes, knew of
the pending attack and knew the town would fall. The United States then
stood by as Srebrenica fell and an enclave that didn't fit into Anthony Lake's
endgame strategy was eliminated. Aerial photos of suspected mass graves,
according to the theory, were suppressed until after the executions were well
over to avoid embarrassment and the United States being called on to stop the
killing.
Id. at 368-69.
59Chuck Sudetic, The Reluctant Gendarme: Why Is France Protecting Indicted War
Criminals in the Sector of Bosnia It Controls?, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 2000, at 91,
97.
60 Hearing of the House Armed Services Committee: U.S. Policy Toward Bosnia, FED.
NEWS SERVICE, May 26, 1993, LEXIS, FEDNEW File (statement of Major General Lewis
MacKenzie).
61 Sir John Nott, Reuters, Nov. 26, 1994, reprinted in 1.12 BALKAN WATCH: ACTION
COUNCIL FOR PEACE IN THE BALKANS (Washington, D.C.), Nov. 28, 1994, available at
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to dismount the sieges and to accept international supervision in a complete
reversal of ethnic cleansing. This would have been infinitely easier in 1992
than the imposition of the Dayton plan-with its pledge to return all
refugees-is now." 62 This assessment was supported by Manfred Woerner,

the then NATO Secretary-General. 63
In the end, the primary risk associated with the approach of
accommodation is that it can become one of appeasement, and possibly
even coercive appeasement. 64 While accommodation may be a useful and
valuable tool, appeasement is characterized by an artificial moral
equivalence, neutrality in the face of aggression, active efforts to erode the
moral imperative to become involved, and the total exclusion of the use of
force and the norm of justice, with the effect of often encouraging further
violence and atrocities.
The approach of coercive appeasement is more nuanced and entails
appeasement within the context of the perceived use of force and the
perceived incorporation of the norm of justice. Coercive appeasement is
characterized first by a general diplomatic deficit which entails the failure
to create the conditions for effective leadership or the articulation of a clear
policy objective coupled with the inability to structure a coordinated or
capable diplomatic process for peace-building. This diplomatic deficit is
augmented by a failure to adequately undergo institutional and personal
"learning" during the peace-building process. Often the diplomatic deficit
encompasses the unintentional misuse of diplomatic signaling, and the
readily transparent articulation of intentions by the peace-builders. Coercive
appeasement is also characterized by aggressive accommodation, which
entails the pursuit of actions designed to meet the needs and interests of the
aggressor, coupled with intentional or unintentional obfuscation of the
aggressor's true objectives.
Moral duplicity is also an element of coercive appeasement, consisting
of the application of pressure on the victims designed to compel their
acquiescence to the primary demands of the aggressor, coupled with
intentional and unintentional actions designed to create division among the
political representatives of the victim state. Moral duplicity also frequently
entails declarations and actions designed to create the perception of moral
equivalence among the parties, thereby eroding the distinction between
aggressor and victim and spreading culpability among all parties.
62

Vulliamy, supra note 3, at 81.

63

Geyer, supra note 11, at 82-83.

Serb leaders "engaged in high-level negotiations with representativesof the
international community while their forces on the ground, executed and buried
thousands of men and boys within a matter of days.... At variouspoints during the
war, these negotiations amounted to appeasement." Report of the Secretary64

General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica,
U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Agenda Item 42,

468, 500, U.N. Doc. A/54/549 (1999).
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Frequently these official pronouncements are designed to actively erode the
moral and strategic imperative to adopt approaches other than that of
accommodation. Finally, coercive appeasement may be characterized by
constrained use of force, which entails activities designed to constrain and
minimize the use of legitimate force, and marginalized justice, which
entails actions designed to minimize and obfuscate the role of justice,
including the political resurrection of culpable partners in peace.
B. Forcing a False Choice Between Justice and Accommodation
Traditionally, many foreign policy practitioners and scholars have
perceived of justice and peace in conflicting terms. The choices are often
cast in terms of either working toward peace and ignoring justice or seeking
justice at the price of jeopardizing any chance for peace. 65 Proponents of
peace are typically characterized as "more aware, more worldly," while
those in favor of justice are characterized as "living
in an unreal world,
66
shall we say, a metaphysical or idealistic realm.,
While this distinction is overly artificial, historically, amnesty or de
facto immunity from prosecution has often been the price for peace. The
Turks, who many considered responsible for the genocidal massacre of over
one million Armenians during World War I, were given amnesty in the 1923
Treaty of Lausanne; 67 the French and Algerians responsible for the slaughter of
thousands of civilians during the Algerian war were given amnesty in the Evian
Agreement of 1962; and Bangladesh gave amnesty in 1973 to Pakistanis
68
charged with genocide in exchange for political recognition by Pakistan.
65 Keith Doubt, "We Had to Jump Over the Moral Bridge": Bosnia and the Pathetic
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WEST IN THE WAR AGAINST BOSNIA 121
66 Id.
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(Stjepan G. Mestrovic ed., 1997).
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Allied Powers for trial. See Treaty of Peace Between the Allied Powers and Turkey (Treaty
of Sevres), Aug. 10, 1920, art. 142, reprinted in 15 AM. J. INT'L L. 179, 209 (Supp. 1921).
The Treaty of Sevres, however, was not ratified and did not come into force. It was replaced
by the Treaty of Lausanne, which not only did not contain provisions respecting the
punishment of war crimes, but also was accompanied by a "Declaration of Amnesty" of all
offenses committed between 1914 and 1922. See Treaty with Turkey and Other Instruments
Signed at Lausanne (Treaty of Lausanne), July 24, 1923, reprinted in 18 AM. J. INT'L L. 1,
37, 50-52, 92-95 (Supp. 1924).
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During the 1980s, to facilitate a transition to democracy, the governments
of Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Uruguay each granted
amnesty to members of the former regime who commanded death squads that
tortured and killed thousands of civilians within their respective countries. 69 To
this list must be added the modem practice of the United Nations, which in the
early 1990s worked to block inclusion of provisions in the Cambodia peace
accords providing for the prosecution of former Khmer Rouge leaders for their
atrocities, pushed the Mandela government to accept an amnesty for crimes
committed by the apartheid regime in South Africa, and helped negotiate, and
later endorsed, a broad amnesty for the leaders of the Haitian military regime in
order to induce them to relinquish power.7 °
Even the Nuremberg experience eventually involved the bartering away
of accountability as the cost for German support of the Western alliance
during the beginning of the Cold War. Within ten years of the conclusion of
the Nuremberg Trials, all 150 of the convicted German war criminals
(including several who were serving life sentences and a few who were
sentenced to death) were released from Landsberg prison pursuant to a
controversial clemency program.71 While this program removed a "diplomatic
pebble from the State Department's shoes," it had the effect of undermining the
purpose of the Nuremberg Trials. In a nation-wide survey conducted by the
U.S. State Department, West Germans overwhelmingly indicated their belief
that the reason
for American leniency was that "[t]hey realize the injustice of
72
trials.
the
As explained by an anonymous UN official, the quest for justice and
retribution is traditionally believed to hamper the search for peace, which in
turn prolongs the conflict, enables the continuation of atrocities, and
increases human suffering. The UN official also asserts that the intrusion of
fact-finding missions seeking to investigate crimes committed by one side

independent nation of Bangladesh. India and Bangladesh initially agreed to bring charges of
genocide and crimes against humanity against 195 of the 10,000 Pakistani troops who had
been captured by India. Meanwhile, Pakistan filed a case before the International Court of
Justice to compel India to repatriate the Pakistani troops. Ultimately, political considerations
prevailed and in 1973 Bangladesh and India agreed not to prosecute the Pakistani prisoners
in exchange for political recognition of Bangladesh by Pakistan and the withdrawal of
Pakistan's case against India before the International Court of Justice. See id.
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70 See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Conclusion: Combating Impunity, in IMPUNrrY
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71 See PETER H. MAGUIRE, LAW AND WAR: AN AMERICAN STORY 217, 221,
223 (2000).
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72Id. at 229.

2003]

JUSTICE IN THE PEACE BUILDING PROCESS

may complicate the task of peace negotiations to the point where they
become prolonged or impossible.7 3
Efforts to build peace in the former Yugoslavia were not exempt from
the conflict between justice and accommodation.7 According to Payam
Akhavan of the Office of the Prosecutor of the Tribunal, "from its very
inception in 1993, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia was surrounded by the so-called 'peace versus accountability'
controversy." According to Akhavan, "It was argued indicting political and
military leaders such as Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic would
undermine the prospects of a peace settlement because they were
indispensable to ongoing negotiations, and because they would have no
incentive to put an end to the fighting without assurances of immunity or
amnesty. '75 In fact, during his tenure as co-chairman of the Yugoslav Peace
Conference, David Owen expressly opposed the prosecution of Serbian
officials engaged in the peace negotiations on the basis that this would
undermine his efforts to craft a settlement.76
Even after the massacre in Srebrenica and the clear pattern of
genocide, policymakers doubted the compatibility of justice and
accommodation. As noted by Richard Goldstone, "[plarticularly at the time
of the negotiations at Dayton, Ohio, in September, 1995, there were many
astute politicians and political commentators who suggested that, in fact,
peace and justice were in opposition, and that the work of the Yugoslav
Tribunal was retarding the peace process in the Balkans. 77 Some
commentators even noted that with Radovan Karadzic's alleged approval
rating among Bosnian Serbs of 79%, any NATO efforts to capture him
would undermine the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accord and
foster the Serbian people's belief that they were subject to perpetual
injustice and persecution. 78 Goldstone rightly expressed surprise at this
view, especially in light of the atrocities which had been committed over
four years.
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In some cases, the existence of a mechanism of justice, such as a
tribunal, may be used to further the efforts of those pursuing an approach of
accommodation by indicating that the norm of justice plays a role outside
the peace process and that questions of culpability belong solely with that
mechanism. For instance, in February 1994, when Secretary of State
Warren Christopher was under pressure by the media to identify those
responsible for the commission of war crimes in Bosnia, which would have
limited his ability to accommodate the interests of those individuals, his
standard press guidance was: "I would like to emphasize that no conclusion
can or should be drawn at this stage as to the culpability of particular
individuals. This is a question that should be reserved for the War Crimes
Tribunal or other court, where the question of culpability will be considered
on a case-by-case basis." 80
Still others, like Richard Holbrooke, asserted that in order to achieve
the aims of justice, it was necessary to negotiate with and if necessary
accommodate/appease those who were responsible for the commission of
atrocities. 81 As such, the insistence on a role for justice was characterized as
something which undermined the effectiveness of the negotiator. When
asked by Senator Smith during his confirmation hearing why he had
systematically declined to ever indicate Milosevic's guilt for the war and
atrocities in the former Yugoslavia, Holbrooke responded, "This is tough
slogging, and my job was not to make moral judgments. I leave that to
moralists and political pundits and columnists, most of whom think they're
moralists anyway. . . . I was well aware of the fact that I might have to
continue to be engaged on other issues. And the highest goal here was to
avoid war, bring peace. 82
Many peace-builders also assert that the conflict between
accommodation and justice reflects the perspectives of those on the ground
trying to save lives versus those more distant from the conflict. For
instance, during his confirmation testimony, Ambassador Holbrooke
responded to criticisms of his persistent failure to acknowledge Milosevic's
culpability as made "by people who haven't been there, who haven't tried
to end wars and prevent wars. 83 Similar statements were made by
numerous generals serving in UNPROFOR, who also invoked the mantra of
"saving lives" over pursuing justice. 84 In fact, as reported by Cambridge
80 Department of State, Final Genocide qia, Press Guidance, drafted Oct. 25, 1993
(released Dec. 13, 1998).
81See RICHARD HOLBROOKE, To END A WAR 367 (1997).
82Hearing of the Senate ForeignRelations Committee: Nomination of RichardHolbrooke
as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, FED. NEWS SERVICE, June 24, 1999, LEXIS,
FEDNEW File (statement of Richard Holbrooke).
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historian Brendan Simms, many of the actual troops on the ground in the
safe areas, and particularly SAS troops, were keenly aware of the failings of
accommodation and urged for a stronger use of force in the pursuit of
justice.
The "saving lives" rational, while encapsulated in only two words, is a
powerful tool used by the negotiators to undermine the influence of the
norm of justice. By characterizing accommodation/appeasement of war
criminals in the cloak of "saving lives," it automatically infers that those
interested in justice are not interested in saving lives, or at least are willing
to permit more killing in order to accomplish an idealistic objective. This
view is succinctly stated by an anonymous UN official who criticized the
then Yugoslav Tribunal prosecutor and president at the time for their public
pressure on the Dayton negotiators. The UN official argues that their "illconsidered statements" could have led to a breakdown of delicate
negotiations in Dayton. 86 "Everyone who was at the Dayton proximity talks
knew that if this issue [mandatory cooperation with the Tribunal] were
pressed it could have ruined the talks.", 87 He declared that they were acting
"irresponsibly" and asked, "in the name of what moral principle would one
be able to defend those [further] deaths?" 88 As evidenced by the subsequent
conflict in Kosovo, it was in fact the act of accommodation at Dayton that
resulted in further deaths, and that only the use of force, coupled with the
indictment of Milosevic, brought an end to ethnic cleansing perpetrated by
Serbian forces.
Some scholarly commentators assert that the tension between justice
and accommodation is inherent in that "[t]he need to establish power
sharing structures that accommodate rival factions and interests may well
clash with the desire to punish perpetrators of human rights abuses" and
"the need to reform the police and the military may be at odds with the
practical need to bring those powerful groups into the peace process. 89 In
their eyes, the inherent tension "prompt[s] the question of which model
works best in a given situation, the power-sharing conflict manager's
model, or the democratizer's political justice model? Empirical evidence
suggests that a concern for justice must be tempered by the realities of
negotiation and by the parties' interests in reaching a political settlement." 90
85
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In response, defenders of the justice norm have argued, "[i]n short,
there is a grudging but emerging widespread acceptance-even among the
so-called realists-that regional peace and stability, democratization, and
multiethnic coexistence in Bosnia-Herzegovina are at best precarious
without the arrest and prosecution of indicted persons," and that "[t]he
[Yugoslav Tribunal] demonstrates that far from being irreconcilable, peace
and accountability, realities and ideals, are inextricably interlinked." 9 1
According to Richard Goldstone, "if one is talking about short term ceasefires, short term cessation of hostilities, it could be that the investigation of
war crimes is a nuisance. But if one is concerned with real peace, enduring
and effective peace, if one is talking about proper reconciliation, then, in
my respectful opinion, there is and can be no contradiction between peace
and justice. ' 92
Despite the tradition of an apparent overwhelming preference for
accommodation over justice, there is no clear evidence that this approach
promotes lasting peace. 93 In fact, the opposite may be the case. For example,
history records that the international amnesty given to the Turkish officials
responsible for the massacre of the Armenians during World War I
encouraged Adolf Hitler some twenty years later to conclude that Germany
could pursue his genocidal policies with impunity. 94 In 1939, in relation to the
acts of genocide and aggression committed by German forces, Hitler remarked,
"Who after all is today speaking about the destruction of the Armenians? ' '95 As
David Matas, a Canadian expert on international law, observed, "Nothing
emboldens a criminal so much as the knowledge he can get away with a crime.
That was the message the failure to prosecute for the Armenian 96massacre gave
to the Nazis. We ignore the lesson of the Holocaust at our peril."
Richard Goldstone declared that in the case of the former Yugoslavia the
failure of the international community to prosecute Pol Pot (Cambodia), Idi
Amin (Uganda), Saddam Hussein (Iraq), and Mohammed Aidid (Somalia),
among others, encouraged the Serbs to launch their policy of ethnic cleansing
with the expectation that they would not be held accountable for their
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international crimes.97 When the international community encourages or
endorses an amnesty for human rights abuses, it sends a signal to other rogue
regimes that they have nothing to lose by instituting repressive measures; if
things start going badly, they can always bargain away their crimes by agreeing
to peace. The apprehension of Slobodan Milosevic in the spring of 2001 and
his trial before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
may be the first step in the reversal of this long history of accommodation and
de facto immunity.
Given the poor track record for accommodation, there has been
increasing demand for an inclusion of the norm of justice in peace-building
since the end of the Cold War.98 For example, since 1989, some level of
justice, in the form of international tribunals and truth commissions, has
been pursued in Argentina, Cambodia, Chile, East Timor, El Salvador,
Ethiopia, Guatemala, Honduras, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and South Africa,
as well as the former Yugoslavia.
V Conclusion
This article has illustrated how the approach of justice/accountability
can aid the peace-building process by denying collective guilt through the
establishment of individual responsibility, enabling the dismantling of
institutions responsible for perpetuating the commission of atrocities,
establishing an accurate historic record, providing a cathartic process for
victims, and deterring atrocities in similar conflicts elsewhere.
While human rights and peace advocates have come to treat the norms
and institutions of justice as a panacea for conflict and atrocities,
professional diplomats generally continue to dismiss justice as at best mere
moral window dressing and at worst an impediment to peace-which can
best be pursued through the approaches of accommodation and/or use of
force. Reared in the school of realism, peace-builders are often perplexed
by the mantra of human rights advocates claiming there can be no peace
without justice, when in fact history appears to be replete with many
instances of peace based on injustice, as well as situations where pursuing
justice has thwarted the quest of peace.
The case study of the Former Yugoslavia examined in this article
demonstrates that the truth lies somewhere in between. Although plagued
by disorganization, a lack of coherency, the pursuit of short term interests,
and the frequent willingness to settle for public relations successes and
97 Michael Scharf, The Case for a PermanentInternational Truth Commission, DUKE J.
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political victories rather than meaningful action, the injection of the norm of
justice and approach of accountability into the Yugoslav peace-building
process did have some measure of success. This is reflected in the creation
of the first ever United Nations War Crimes Tribunal, the requirements to
cooperate with the Tribunal built into the Dayton and Paris Peace Accords,
the fall from power and eventual prosecution of officials responsible for
international crimes, and the deployment of multi-national force to stop
ethnic aggression and international peacekeepers to promote the protection
of human rights in the area.
The effectiveness of the justice-based institutions developed for the
Yugoslav crisis, however, was seriously undermined by an outdated
perception held by the peace builders of the relationship between justice
and peace-building, the lack of experience of peace-builders in creating and
operating institutions of justice, and the lack of an understanding of the
important role of justice by some of the key individuals tasked with
operating the institutions of justice. The effect of this can be seen in the
watering down of the justice provisions in the Dayton and Paris Accords,
the failure to give a mandate to the military forces to apprehend indicted
war criminals, the Tribunal's unnecessary delay in indicting Slobodan
Milosevic, and the refusal of the Security Council to impose sanctions on
Serbia for its many instances of non-cooperation with the Tribunal.
Consequently, to date, few of the functions of justice have been fully
realized in the former Yugoslavia. As a result of the mixed record of the
approach of accountability in the Yugoslav crisis, many foreign policy
practitioners and international relations scholars continue to view the role of
justice in peace-building with significant skepticism.
But to turn away from the justice/accountability approach for this
reason, would be to take the wrong lesson from the Yugoslav experience.
Rather, the lesson of peace-building in the former Yugoslavia is that if
applied and implemented adeptly, justice is compatible with peace, and in
fact may be critical to attaining a meaningful and durable peace.

